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VoLuME XLVI JUNE, 1940 NUMBER 4
FORFEITURE OF LEASE FOR FAILURE TO MARKET GAS
C. C. WamniAs, JR.*
R. B. GooDwiN**
By the custom of Cornwall, suspension of mining operations
for a year and a day was ground for forfeiture of the operator's
interest in the mineral lands.' That ancient ruling of the Stannary
Court was "not founded on the doctrine of demand and supply,
but on the expediency simply of bringing the mineral to the sur-
face for the use of men."' During the last few decades a similar
theory has been received over into American law, forbidding a
lessee of the minerals from seeking to tie up property indefinitely
to the exclusion of the owner.3 No such lease, it is usually said,
"can be construed to enable" the operator "merely to hold for
purposes of speculation" without any obligation to mine or com-
pensate: "otherwise, the agreement might prove entirely fruitless"
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
** Member of the Student Board of Editors, West Virginia Law Quarterly.
'Loveland v. Longhenry, 145 Wis. 60, 68-69, 129 N. W. 650 (1911), decree-
ing forfeiture after fourteen months' failure to mine iron ore. Cf. Cole Petro-
leum Co. v. United States Gas & Oil Co., 121 Tex. 59, 41 S. W. (2d) 414, 86
A. L. R. 719 (1931) where there was cancellation because of the operator's
omission to market gas diligently over a period of two years and eight months.
2 Rogers v. Brenton, 10 Q. B. 26, 59, 116 Eng. Rep. R. 10 (1847). The court
explained (at p. 58): "The only things which make this reasonable are the
render of the toll tin to the owner, and the benefit to the public secured thereby
in the extraction of the mineral from the bowels of the earth. Both these are
not only lost, but the latter, it may be, positively prevented, if the bounder
may decline to work, and yet retain the right to exclude the owner."
3Starn v. Hoffman, 62 W. Va. 422, 59 S. E. 179 (1907) in which Judge
Brannon affirmed the forfeiture of a coal lease for failure to mine, after a
default of two years and three months. Cf. Elliott v. Crystal Springs Oil Co.,
106 Kan. 248, 187 Pac. 692 (1920), holding an oil and gas lease terminated by
its specific terms, when for seven months operations had ceased because of lack
of market for the gas produced.
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1P'ORMEITURE OF LEASE
as to rents and royalties.' The very uniformity in this judicial
reasoning seems to indicate a corresponding uniformity in the
cause that has prompted it.
As to its origin, this rule has no doubt sprung from an eternal
conflict of policy between owner and operator, -the one demand-
ing immediate exploitation of his minerals, with the other looking
only to possible gains out of mining operations. And perhaps over
the centuries the lessee's frequent abuse of his exclusive privilege
has led judges to formulate this drastic sanction, "to encourage
the others" to speedy development. In any event, it has been
assumed blindly that the interests of society required early pro-
duction, and that only: the important thing was to get the minerals
out of the ground and to their market. Practical difficulties in ex-
traction, - considerations of over-production, - or even modern
notions about conservation of natural resources meant relatively
little to the courts. Sometimes their decisions stressed an economic
ideal of national self-sufficiency; more often, the owner's claim to
rents and royalties dictated the result. But on one principle or
another, there has had to be some sort of continuous mining activity
if the operator wanted to avoid dangerous litigation.
Naturally the operator's job of developing will vary in extent,
having regard to the minerals under exploitation; and in the oil
and gas field, his obligations must be more exacting because of their
fugacious character. Thus it is that there exists in the oil and
gas lease an implied covenant for the use of reasonable diligence
in the marketing of the product, quite in addition to the customary
task of drilling and protecting the leasehold. That implied cove-
nant connotes the duty of the ordinary prudent lessee under all the
4 Crawford v. Richey, 43 W. Va. 252, 258, 27 S. E. 220 (1897), approving
a suit to quiet title since the lessee had done absolutely nothing, though nearly
eight years had elapsed. "Generally, all leases of land for the exploration and
development of minerals are executed with the expectation and upon the con-
dition, either express or implied, that the land will be developed for such a
purpose and where the parties have not fully covered the subject of delay by
rental provisions, the lessee's rights terminate upon his non-performance of
the conditions", Benedum-Trees Oil Co. v. Davis, 107 F. (2d) 981, 984 (C. C. A.
6th, 1939).
5 More precisely, the duty of the lessee is either to market the product or
deliver it for marketing. In the event of default, there are two theories as to
lessor's remedy:
1. The lessor may only recover damages for breach of the
implied covenant in this regard.
2. The lessor may cancel the lease in equity, on the basis of
an implied condition of forfeiture for failure to market.
The authorities are fairly evenly divided as to which of these remedies may
be available in an extreme situation.
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circumstances, taking into account the interests of both parties."
Unfortunately, our courts have in the past failed to spell out
more precisely either the nature of this duty or the penalty to be
imposed for failure to market diligently: their opinions are scarce-
ly entitled to the praise of clearness in expression or fidelity to the
declared judicial doctrine. Recent cases7 have now brought the
problem once more to the attention of the oil and gas industry, so
that the implied covenant to market tends to have increasing sig-
nificance particularly as respects gas production. It is accordingly
important to ascertain whether there may properly be forfeiture
of an oil and gas lease merely for failure to market diligently the
gas from producing wells.
In order to clarify the issue, certain necessary assumptions
ought to be made at the start. If the oil and gas lease is regarded
as conveying to the lessee a profit a prendre (in theory at least), no
question will then arise of forfeiting any corporeal mineral in-
terest.8 On the other hand, discovery plus protection must be held
in West Virginia to establish a "vested estate" for the life of the
0 Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 127, 48 N. E. 502 (1897): "The
development and protection of lines which is thus implied when the lease is
silent is such as is usually found in the same business of an ordinarily prudent
man, - neither the highest nor the lowest, but the medium or average." This
standard was adopted by Judge Van Devanter in the leading case of Brewster
v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801, 72 C. C. A. 213 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905), and
became the West Virginia rule in Jennings v. So. Carbon Co., 73 W. Va. 215,
80 S. E. 368 (1913).
In Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 117 W. Va. 650, 664-665, 187 S. E. 331
(1936), Judge Maxwell said: "Matters pertaining to the drilling of oil and
gas wells, and to the producing of oil and gas are primarily within the sound
discretion of the operator. It is he who carries the hazard and the burden of
the cost. As long as his procedure is in accord with standard methods he will
not be interfered with by the courts. It is only when it seems evident the
procedure adopted by him is clearly prejudicial to the rights of the lessor,
that he (operator) will be required by a court of equity to do otherwise."
7 Representative decisions raising the issue are Hutchinson v. McCue, 101
F. (2d) 111 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939), discussed in Note (1940) 46 W. VA. L. Q.
154, and Benedum-Trees Oil Co. v. Davis, 107 P. (2d) 981 (C. C. A. 6th,
1939).
8 See Simonton, The Nature of the Interest of the Grantee under an Oil and
Gas Lease (1917) 25 W. VA. L. Q. 295. The extent of the operator's invest-
ment makes this an exclusive profit a prendre.
Where the jurisdiction recognizes a legal corporeal estate in the mineral
lessee, as in Wilmore Coal Co. v. Brown, 147 Fed. 931 (C. C. Pa. 1906), 153
Fed. 143 (C. C. A. 3d, 1907), or Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas 0. & G. Co.,
113 Tex. 160, 254 S. W. 290, 29 A. L. R. 566 (1923), there is far greater
difficulty. Theoretically, there cannot bp abandonment of such a property
interest: thus the favorite method for cancelling leases would be removed out
of the court's reach, and termination rendered much less feasible.
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field,9 subject of course to loss through serious misconduct.10 Ob-
viously the production should satisfy the "paying quantities" te. t"
in volume and pressure only; whether or not the lessee can market
seems wholly immaterial on this score. That is simply to say a gas
well may be thought of as producing in paying quantities, even
though it has been capped for a time awaiting further marketing
facilities. 2 For present purposes, also, it is of little moment which
of the various standards be chosen for measuring the operator's
conduct,'3 -the essential fact being always that he has acquitted
himself of his task in a fair and honorable fashion. Over and
above these considerations, it must be assumed procedurally that
the lessor has duly served adequate notice to market, 14 unless lapse
9 Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909), syl. par.
4: "The discovery of oil or gas under a lease giving right of exploration and
production, unless there is something in the lease manifesting a contrary inten-
tion, is sufficient to create a vested estate in the lessee in the exclusive right to
produce oil or gas provided for therein."
10 Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 88 S. E. 1075 (1916) ; Ad-
kins v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 113 W. Va. 490, 168 S. E. 366 (1933) ;
Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 113 W. Va. 839, 169 S. E. 529 (1933) ; and
Dillard v. United Fuel Gas Co., 114 W. Va. 684, 183 S. E. 573 (1934).
11 Barbour, Stedman & Co. v. Tompkins, 81 W. Va. 116, 93 S. E. 1038, L. It.
A. 1918B 365 (1917). In Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Adkins, 278 Fed. 854 (C. C. A.
6th, 1922), the distinction is suggested as to who determines the "paying
quantities", between the percentage gas royalty case and the gas well rental
situation. See, also, on the issue of the operator's ability to market as defining
"paying quantities", United States v. Brown, 15 F. (2d) 565 (D. C. 1926),
and Nystel v. Thomas, 42 S. W. (2d) 168 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
12 Summerville v. Apollo Gas Co., 207 Pa. 334, 338, 56 At]. 876 (1904): "It
may be that for some time the lessee whs not able to find a purchaser for the
gas, but that was not the affair of the lessors. They were not interested in the
proceeds of the sale of the gas. Their rights under the agreement extended
only to the receipts of a stipulated annual rental for each well-and the free use
of gas for domestic purposes. Beyond this the question of whether or not the
quantity of gas was profitable was for the decision of the lessee. It may be
that the final disposition of the product was such as to amply remunerate it
(lessee) for the delay in finding a market." J. B. Gathright Land Co. v. Ken-
tucky-W. Va. Gas Co., 65 F. (2d) 907 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933), ace. Cf., however,
Benedum-Trees Oil Co. v. Davis, 107 F. (2d) 981, 985 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939):
"The term 'paying quantities' involves not only the amount of production,
but also the ability to market at a profit." Hanks v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,
24 S. W. (2d) 5 (Tex. Com. App. 1930) seems to hold with the latter state-
ment.
13 Apart from the prudent operator test, mentioned in footnote 6, supra,
there is the "good faith" standard. Colgan v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa. 234, 242,
45 Atl. 119 (1899), decided that as long as a "lessee is acting in good faith on
business judgment, he is not bound to take the other party's, but may stand
on his own." That Pennsylvania doctrine has been widely adopted in other
jurisdictions: a federal court of another circuit even characterized it as "ap-
parently well-established in the West Virginia courts." See Updegraff v.
United Fuel Gas Co., 67 F. (2d) 431 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933).
14 Howerton v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 82 Kan. 367, 108 Pac. 813 (1910);
American Wholesale Corp. v. F. & S. Oil & Gas Co., 242 Ky. 356, 46 S. W. (2d)
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of time and long indifference have dispensed with such a condition
precedent.15 Analogously, ordinary defenses founded on waiver or
estoppel are disregarded here, 16 so far as they are likely to mislead
or confuse the solution.
Moreover, it should not be inferred that relief automatically
follows whenever the producing well is shut in and marketing of
gas suspended. Certainly a temporary cessation of production
where deeper drilling is in progress,' 7 - or where short periods of
business depression intervene,'"- or, perhaps, where an extensive
reserve is being built up to care for unusual seasonal demands, 9 - -
498 (1932); and Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co., 95 Mont. 434, 28 P. (2d) 187
(1934). In Alford v. Dennis, 102 Kan. 403, 407, 170 Pac. 1005 (1918), the
court held: "We think this lawsuit will answer the purpose of a demand for
drilling. I
15 Benedum-Trees Oil Co. v. Davis, 107. F. (2d) 981, 986 (C. C. A. 6th,
1939): "The rule laid down in Leeper v. Lemon G. Neely Co., 6 Cir., 293 P.
967, 971, that before a lease can be terminated by the lessor for failure to
develop, notice must be given lessee, is inapplicable here. Such notice or
demand is unnecessary where termination of the lease may be inferred from the
fact the lessee has been in default for an unreasonable time or has intention-
ally breached the express or implied obligations of the contract." Gadbury v.
Ohio & I. Gas Co., 162 Ind. 9, 67 N. E. 259 (1903); Soaper v. King, 167 Ky.
121, 180 S. W. 46 (1915); and Hitt v. Henderson, 112 Okla. 194, 240 Pac. 745
(1925), ace.
16 In Steven v. Potlatch Oil & Ref. Co., 80 Mont. 239, 260 Pac. 119 (1927),
the express language of the lease provided that during the time any such gas
was "shut in by reason of there being no profitable market for its output,
there shall be no royalty.' The court accordingly held there was no expiration
at the end of the definite term.
On the analogy of the rule that acceptance of delay rentals operates to
waive breaches of the implied covenant to test (if fraudulent drainage be ab-
sent), Reserve Gas Co. v. Wilson, 78 W. Va. 329, 88 S. E. 1075 (1916), and
Johnson v. Armstrong, 81 W. Va. 399, 94 S. E. 753 (1918), it has been held
in California similarly as to royalties that their voluntary receipt constitutes
waiver. Kern Sunset Oil Co. v. Good Roads Oil Co., 214 Cal. 435, 6 P. (2d)
71, 80 A. L. R. 453 (1931). The alleged fraudulent drainage decisions, Trim-
ble v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 113 W. Va. 839, 169 S. E. 529 (1933), as to pay-
ment of delay rentals, and Dillard v. United Fuel Gas Co., 114 W. Va. 684, 173
S. E. 573 (1934), as to payment of oil and gas royalties, must rest on their own
peculiar facts.
17 As in Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836 (1909).
See Note (1931) 72 A. L. R. 372. Cf. Rogers v. Brenton, 10 Q. B. 26, 64, 116
Eng. Rep. R. 10 (1847): "Nothing we have said compels the bounder to strictly
continuous working: such reasonable time for consideration, preparation and
due selection of places and planes, must always be allowed as the nature of the
undertaking reasonably requires; and, when he has once bona fide worked, his
ceasing to work for a time will be therefore open to explanation, so as to
prevent a forfeiture. It is only when the conduct of the bounder is such as
to warrant the conclusion that he has ceased to be, in good faith, pursuing that
object which alone justified his entry on the land, and which is the reasonable
foundation of his title."
is See Pennagrade Oil & Gas Co. v. Martin, 211 Ky. 137, 277 S. W. 302
(1925).
'0 Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Bushmaier, 165 Ark. 303, 264 S. W. 830
(1924).
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should lie within the reasonable discretion of the operator. Again,
statutory regulation of large gas fields may attempt some plan of
"pro-rating" production ;20 if a constitutional method is ultimately
achieved, legal impossibility should then adequately explain any
consequent failure to dispose of the gas.2 ' Instances of this sort,
however, have persuaded the larger operating companies in many
states22 to include within their standard leases a provision which
substitutes a gas well rental for the customary gas royalty, where
sale off the premises is unavoidably prevented.23 The lessor will in
fact contract out of any cause of action founded on the failure to
market.
20 See LEGAL HISTORY OF CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAs (1938), a Symposium
published by the Section of Mineral Law of the American Bar Association.
In Texas, for example, during the fall of 1934, under stripping permits, over
a billion cubic feet of gas was being blown into the air daily, making an annual
loss in energy equal to 62,634,000 barrels of oil or 487,000 freight cars of coal.
These operations so rapidly depleted the supply of gas in the West Panhandle
Field that legislative hearings were begun to prevent further waste. A now
gas conservation statute was prepared and enacted (Tex. Acts 1935, a. 120)
authorizing administrative pro-rating of the production of gas from each com-
mon reservoir, and administrative adjustment of the correlative rights and
privileges of each owner to produce and market. A few months later, an
administrative order was entered by the Texas commission regulating produc-
tion in the Panhandle Field: this was held unconstitutional, within the due
process clause, in Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U. S. 55, 57
S. Ct. 364, 81 L. Ed. 510 (1937). A contemporary effort of the industry in
the East Texas and mid-continent fields, with the approval and blessing of
certain governmental authorities, to eliminate existing distress gasoline by a
general raising of prices, has recently been held to have been a violation of
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act: United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc.,
60 S. Ct. 811, 84 L. Ed. 760 (U. S. 1940). (The shocking conditions that
have prevailed in this highly competitive business of exploiting gas and oil
resources and the apparent legislative inability to correct them might serve to
remind one once more that "of all the arts, that of government has been
brought least to perfection.") But see Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Rowan &
Nichols Oil Co., 84 L. Ed. 983 (U. S. 1940).
21Buie v. Porter, 228 S. W. 999 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Jamieson v. Indiana
Natural Gas & Oil Co., 128 Ind. 555, 28 N. E. 76 (1891).22 Among these are Arkansas, California, Louisiana and Texas. Older juris-
dictions in oil and gas law, - such as Pennsylvania and West Virginia, - do
not seem to have such a lease provision.
23 An example of the newer lease provision follows:
Louisiana Oil and Gas Lease, Form 10 Corrected, Revised.
"During any period when, after a discovery of gas on said
land, gas is not sold on account of lack of a market, and is not
being used off the land or in the manufacture of gasoline or other
product, and there is no current production or operation on said
land sufficient to keep this lease in force, lessee may pay as royalty
Fifty Dollars ($50) per year for each shut-in gas well, and it will
be considered that gas is being produced, within the meaning of
paragraph 2 hereof, during any period for which such payment
is made, and no rental shall inure during any period covered by
such a payment."
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The problem, one must note carefully, is one of forfeiture of
the lease for unreasonable failure to market gas production, -
which entails the implication of an equitable condition subsequent
through which the lessee's valuable interest may be divested be-
cause of grave misconduct. Other doctrines favoring the lessor
on slightly different facts have no part in this discussion. More
specifically, there is the one theory of expiration of the lease:
following the primary or fixed term for exploration, it is said to
be a condition prerequisite to the operation of the extension clause,
("and so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying
quantities"), that actual profitable production exist. In other
words, unless the lessee is producing and marketing gas from the
leasehold on the last day of the fixed term, the extension provision
of the habendum never takes effect; the lease just expires, so it is
claimed, by its very language. For example, assuming originally a
ten-year initial period, the operator's interest is at an end in the
absence of marketing ten years later.2 4 To be sure, that expiration
theory runs squarely counter to prevailing ideas about the lessee's
"vested estate for the life of the field", and it is difficult to under-
stand how these can simultaneously thrive in any jurisdiction. But
it is well within judicial powgrs to practice such legerdemain occa-
sionally,- with the result that the possibility of expiration must
always be kept in mind.
The other theory which is excluded from the present investi-
gation is that of abandonment, - a concept sadly overworked in
oil and gas litigation. Analytically, it is a shorthand way of
24 This seems to have been the latent ratio deeidendi in Hutchinson v. Mc-
Cue, 101 F. (2d) 111 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939) and Benedum-Trees Oil Co. v.
Davis, 107 F. (2d) 981 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939). To the same general effect are
Collins v. Mt. Pleasant Oil & Gas Co., 85 Kan. 483, 118 Pac. 54 (1911); Smith
v. Sun Oil Co., 172 La. 655, 135 So. 15 (1931) ; and Berthelote v. Loy Oil Co.,
95 Mont. 434, 28 P. (2d) 187 (1934). Cf. dictum in Smith v. Dudley, 114 W.
Va. 696, 698, 174 S. E. 523 (1934): "If, after expiration of the eighteen
year period, production should cease, the grantor's rights should immediately
terminate. The right beyond eighteen years was dependent upon a paying
production at the expiration of that time." See, also, Harness v. Eastern Oil
Co., 49 W. Va. 232, 38 S. E. 662 (1901).
On the other hand, in McCutcheon v. Enon Oil & Gas Co., 102 W. Va. 345,
353-354, 135 S. E. 238 (1926), the court remarked: "We can see very little
strength in the claim that the lease has expired by its own terms at the end of
the ten-year period. If there had been no development, and a vested interest
had not accrued, then the payment of delayed land rental would not extend
the right to drill after the ten years given for that purpose.... The law favors
the vesting of estates, and is adverse to their destruction after they have been
vested .... Under the facts shown it cannot be held that the lease had expired
at the end of the ten year term." The McCutcheon case is perhaps a leading
authority to the effect that expiration cannot be based on mere failure to
market gas from produc.ing wells.
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describing what amounts to the surrender by operation of law of
an easement or profit; certainly there is nothing in the common
law of real property that permits one to divest himself of title
simply by relinquishing it, in the manner of "abandoning" a
chattel. And clearly the lessee under an undeveloped "or" lease
(without a surrender clause) cannot escape payment of delay
rentals by a unilateral renouncement of his rights. Nor may the
parties by informal agreement achieve a surrender in fact, in de-
fiance of the Statute of Frauds. The best analogy in legal doctrine
has to do with the resumption of possession by a landlord, after his
tenant has moved out, and the former's utilizing the premises for
his own purposes thereafter. So, in the field of mineral law, where
the senior lessee deliberately neglects or quits his leasehold, the
owner may by re-letting to a junior lessee accept the other's "offer"
for a surrender by operation of law of the prior oil and gas lease ;21
it is only a confusion of terms when courts follow the lay practice
of calling this abandonment. Nevertheless, the theory (however
it be named) does have considerable value within limits. Applying
it in instances where the operator's conduct has been outrageous,
there is usually a most salutary result. Where the lessee under the
"or" lease goes along for years without drilling or paying,25 - or
the lessee pulls the casing from a producer and moves away with
his machinery and equipment,27 - or he shuts in a paying well and
25 Clark v. Wright, 311 Pa. 69, 77-78, 166 Atl. 775 (1933): "An unexplained
cessation of operations under a lease the term of which depends upon produc-
tion, without remuneration to the lessor for an unreasonable length of time,
gives rise to a fair presumption of surrender, and, standing alone and admitted,
would justify the court in declaring an abandonment or a surrender as a matter
of law." Simonton, Abandonment of Interests in Land (1930) 25 ILL. L.
REv. 261, 275: "The cases holding mining leases terminable by abandonment
because of long continued breach of the duty to develop use the term inaccur-
ately. The termination in such cases is by implied release or implied surrender,
depending on whether the court treats the mining lease as a true lease or as a
profit." Carper v. 'United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 438, 89 S. E. 12
(1916): "As a matter of actual decision, the doctrine of implied covenants in
mineral leases has thus far been limited to those cases in which it has been
invoked to .... make effective the principle of surrender by operation of law,
when the premises have been abandoned after discovery of mineral and delay
rentals have ceased."
Suit v. A. Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317, 61 S. E. 307 (1908) is an
excellent example of the statement in the text. As to solid minerals, see the
famous opinion in Chandler v. French, 73 W. Va. 658, 81 S. E. 825 (1914).
25 Smith v. Root, 66 W. Va. 633, 6. S. E. 1005 (1910); Martin v. Consol.
Coal & Oil Corp., 101 W. Va. 721, 133 S. E. 626 (1926).
27 Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 51 W. Va. 583, 42 S. E. 655
(1902); Lowther Oil Co. v. Miller-Sibley Oil Co., 53 W. Va. 501, 44 S. U.
433 (1903).
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without reasonable explanation ignores the available market,2
in all these cases completely indifferent to the lessor's hope of royal-
ties, the lessee should properly be held to a surrender. Here his
acts speak louder than words; taking such behavior at its face
value, the owner has a simple remedy of self-help by executing a
junior lease.
Thus in the typical abandonment situation one meets a set of
facts where there can be little sympathy for the operator. The
trouble is that courts tend to overemphasize the theory. If pro-
ceedings in equity come before the trial chancellor, entitling the
complainant to relief by forfeiture for violation of some implied
condition, the decree of cancellation is more often intuitively based
on legal abandonment. Even though the evidence conclusively
negatives any conduct remotely resembling surrender, the opinion
will just the same refer to it as "a technical abandonment." 2'
Perhaps the explanation lies in the old maxim to the effect that
"equity abhors a forfeiture"; judicial reasoning is squeamish as
to forfeitures, when any other theory (no matter how far-fetched)
can be employed to justify the result. Too frequently courts ignore
the enlightened dictum of Judge Van Devanter :30
"There is no insuperable objection to the enforcement of
a forfeiture when that is more consonant with the principles
of right, justice, and morality than to withhold equitable re-
lief."
But in the circumstances, since the incompatible advantages of
reality and deception cannot be united, matters of doctrine become
somewhat muddled, - and strict abandonment theory gradually
extends by equitable fiction into wholly new fields.
Whenever a lessee fails to market gas from a producing well
and litigation ensues, the claim that there has been an abandonment
2S Beatty-Nickel Oil Co. v. Smethers, 49 Ind. App. 602, 96 N. E. 19 (1911) ;
Monarch Oil & Gas Co. v. Hunt, 193 Ky. 315, 235 S. W. 772 (1921). Cf., also,
Harris v. Michael, 70 W. Va. 356, 73 S. E. 934 (1912).
25 Hutchinson v. MeCue, 101 F. (2d) 111, 120 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939): "One
hardly expects to find a parallel for the extraordinary conduct of the Hamilton
Gas Company in deliberately refusing profitable business. The fact that gas
had been found and made ready for delivery to customers did not excuse the
company's refusal to produce and market, but served rather to condemn it.
The actions of the company, if not a technical abandonment by the lessee,
were of a strikingly similar character."
2o In the great case of Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801, 819, 72
C. C. A. 213 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905). Abell v. Bishop, 86 Mont. 478, 497, 284 Pac.
525 (1930): "The general rule that forfeitures are not favored in the law does
not apply to leases for the purpose of having lands explored for oil or gas;
rather in this class of cases forfeitures are favored."
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is fairly certain to be made somewhere along the line. Quite pos-
sibly the lessee did in effect abandon his leasehold, for one reason
or another, and the proof will establish this: there are plenty of
cases in the books where that has occurred. It is essential to realize,
however, that in nearly all these instances he has also been guilty
of other far more serious acts than mere failure to market. In
substance, he has ignored most of his express and implied obliga-
tions as to testing, protecting and further developing the leasehold:
the lack of marketing is merely a cumulative incident in his
abandonment by conduct. The problem as to forfeiture solely be-
cause the operator does not duly dispose of the gas is quite different.
Here there has been no disposition on his part to neglect any addi-
tional phase of development or protection. By way of instance,"'
he has kept the equipment painted and in good order, and has
mowed the right of way; he has made periodical tests of open
flows and rock pressures; and, in general, he has taken the reason-
ably prudent operator's care of these wells. Additionally, within
the rule of the Black Band case, s2 he has had the lease properly
assessed and paid necessary taxes thereon. Under such conditions
and apart from deliberate fraud, there can hardly be room for any
contention involving the claim of abandonment.
Granted the problem of forfeiture can be wholly isolated from
theories of expiration and abandonment, it would be well to in-
vestigate the various types of situations in which the issue arises.
Perhaps the most common one involves the development of a gas
field in "wildcat" territory: sometimes lessors believe the mere
discovery of oil or gas in paying quantities will, in and of itself,
create an adequate market.3 3  The question then is whether the
parties could reasonably have contemplated gas would not be sold
31 Hutchinson v. McCue, 101 F. (2d) 111 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939), Record, p.
36, Finding of Fact No. 7. McCutcheon v. Enon Oil & Gas Co., 102 W. Va. 345,
350, 135 S. E. 238 (1926): "Its (the lessee's) failure to pay the rental does
not work abandonment."
32 State v. Black Band Consol. Coal Co., 113 W. Va. 872, 169 S. E. 614
(1933), to the effect that proper assessment of an operator's producing oil and
gas leasehold, together with timely payment of all taxes thereon, prevents for-
feiture of the lease by virtue of a tax sale covering the lessor's property. Thus,
the operator may now adequately safeguard his leasehold, as regards the
State's claim for taxes, simply by having it duly assessed in the county where
it is located and by taking care of the taxes as these are levied, - quite regard-
less of what the lessor may or may not do in this regard.
3 3 In McCuteheon v. Enon Oil & Gas Co., 102 W. Va. 345, 348, 135 S. E. 238
(1926), the lease was in wildcat territory: it was hardly within the contem-
plation of either party that gas would be marketed until a pipe-line had been
built into that territory. The court connented: "The gas from the first
well was never marketed, for there was no market for it, except by piping it
10
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until at some future time a pipe line had been built into that
region. The real difficulty here is as to the fate of the small inde-
pendent operators who initially develop the field, only to find other
companies later taking leases on all sides and the danger of drain-
age a very real one. When the pipe line is finally constructed, the
independent with limited capital is under pressure to market at
almost any price; in default thereof, his lessors are hardly likely to
remain quiescent over very many years, without definite prospect
of royalty payments. Often the marketing agreement signed will
provide merely that the purchaser promises to buy the other's gas,
but for the immediate future only if and when the purchaser needs
it. It may indeed be hard to convince the lessors that patience is
essential to the welfare of each. Another situation involves the
drilling of new wells in a proven field, where the operator con-
fidently expects to market as soon as an additional already-pro-
jected pipe line is completed. In this second instance, one can
scarcely argue (as before) that lessor and lessee made it an implied
term of their bargain, to dispense altogether with rents and royal-
ties pending arrival of the pipe line. And yet it is safe to assume
the operator has ordinarily no other marketing facilities at hand.
Hence, an unforeseen delay in the arrival of the new line may
prevent sale of the gas for a considerably long period, and present
the lessor with an opportunity of seeking forfeiture on these facts. 4
However, the situation most representative of unanticipated hard-
ship is that created in a regularly producing area by a severe busi-
ness depression nearby: the operator must lose his best customers
when their industries close down, so that there can be no alternative
a great distance, the cost of which would have been prohibitive." Cf. White
v. Green River Gas Co., 8 F. (2d) 261, 263 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925): "While it
appears from the record that the time this lease was executed this territory
was known by lessors and lessee to be 'wildcat' territory, yet the presumption
naturally obtains that the term of five years named in the lease was in the
opinion of both parties sufficient time in which this 'wildcat' territory could
be reasonably developed." Masterson v. Amarillo Oil Co., 253 S. W. 908,
914 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) lays down a sensible doctrine as to these issues:
"What is a reasonable time in which the gas shall be marketed,. and what
amounts to the exercise of reasonable diligence in wildcat territory under all
the circumstances, are questions of fact."
34 Delay in the construction of the necessary pipe-line was involved both in
Hutchinson v. McCue, 101 F. (2d) 111 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939), and in Benedum-
Trees Oil Co. v. Davis, 107 F. (2d) 981 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939). But see Union
Gas & Oil Co. v. Adkins, 278 Fed. 854, 857-858 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922): "Never-
theless a court of equity would hesitate to decree the cancellation of a lease,
where .... the failure to procure the laying of a pipe-line within the term
named in the lease, is in no wise chargeable to the delay or default of the
lessee in the development of the territory to such an extent as would justify a
pipe-line company in making this expenditure."
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other than to shut in the wells. No doubt the lessor never thought
of that contingency: on the other hand, the operator may not be
able to continue to pay rentals without some sort of market for the
gas. After such a prolonged suspension of operations, it is likely
the issue will ultimately reach the stage of a cancellation suit.
Frequently, the lessee will try to avoid litigation by making
stipulated payments under his lease despite conditions that suspend
marketing. Where the instrument provides for a fixed gas well
rental,35 there seems little doubt 36 that that procedure effectively
safeguards his rights. One might even generalize: just as equity
will never forfeit a lease in this jurisdiction for mere failure to pay
money, 7 so the payment or tender of contractual well rentals will
normally avert forfeiture for any sort of failure to market. Be-
yond that generalization, one can only guess as to a court's holding.
A common practice in many gas fields is to arrange a formal com-
promise vith the lessor, (whichever be the character of the gag
revenue originally promised), by the terms of which the lessee re-
sumes payment of ordinary delay rentals over the period of sus-
pension. Surely by accepting these "delay rentals", the lessor
definitely waives the alleged cause of action growing out of the
implied duty to sell off the premises; for after all he need not take
the reduced payments unless there were the compromise agreement.
The newer lease provision elsewhere, already referred to,"5 permits
the operator to pay specified well rental in the event of a shut-in:
it is practically certain such a clause will be upheld. So long as
the lessor receives some reasonable compensation, forfeiture for
nonmarketing is hardly probable, - provided always drainage
possibilities are absent.
*What if the operator cannot or will not pay rentals or royal-
ties during the cessation of operations? At law, the lessor seems
remediles: the standard form of lease covenants for those pay-
ments only "on gas produced from said land and sold or used off
the land."" One court has held any sums actually paid were
- McGraw Oil & Gas Co. v. Kennedy, 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S. E. 1027 (1909);
Smith v. McGill, 12 F. (2d) 32 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
36 White v. Green River Gas Co., 8 F. (2d) 261 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925), raises
some troubling questions in this regard.
37 Reserve Gas Co. v. Carbon Black Mfg. Co., 72 W. Va. 757, 79 S. E. 1002
(1913) ; Pheasant v. Hanna, 63 W. Va. 613, 60 S. E. 618 (1908).
38 See footnote 23, supra.
39 The ordinary gas well rental provision in West -Virginia reads as follows:
.... To pay .................... ($ .......... ) Dollars each three months in advance
for the gas from each and every gas well drilled on said premises, the product
from which is marketed and used off the premises as a gas well, said payment
12
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"mere gratuities": "the lessors had no right to demand and no
right of action to recover these rentals. "4 Any redress must then
be sought in equity. And even there, if the lease provides for fixed
gas well rentals (rather than gas royalties), the operator ought to
be able to placate the trial chancellor by tender of a sum covering
the period of nonactivity down to the date of the equity bill. The
narrow issue as to possible forfeiture for failure properly to market
can be raised only in two instances: first, where there is an abso-
lute refusal to pay the fixed rentals under any circumstances while
marketing remains impossible; and second, where the lessor's com-
pensation is in the form of a gas royalty provision, calculation of
which is not feasible after the well has been capped. In the one
case the operator will not pay, but in the other, there is no way
for him to estimate fairly the proper payment. In both, the lessor
is being deprived of the promised advantage of the mining opera-
tion.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the present problem
has to do with an operator who has been unable to market gas for
a considerable time because of factual conditions wholly beyond
his control. 7 ile there has been no expiration of the vested estate
nor abandonment of the leasehold, the operator simply will not or
cannot make the contractual payments to the lessor, until an oppor-
tunity of.marketing creates the obligation and determines its extent.
On the other hand, the lessor's minerals have been tied up more
or less indefinitely, so that his lease is proving "entirely fruitless"
as to rents and royalties. Attempts to reconcile the conflicting
to be made on each well from date utilized, and to be paid each three months
thereafter while the gas from said well is so marketed and used."
In construing a rental provision to this effect, it has been held there is no
liability for rentals unless the operator is in fact able to market: Leslie v.
Chase National Bank, 83 F. (2d) 1013 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936), Printed Record
therein, p. 53, lower court opinion per Cochran, Dist. J. (1933). See, also,
Note (1933) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 68; Rockcastle Gas Co. v. Horn, 241 Ky. 398,
44 S. W. (2d) 273 (1931); lams v. Carnegie Natural Gas Co., 194 Pa. 72, 45
Atl. 54 (1899); Brooks v. Ark.-La. Pipe Line Co., 77 F. (2d) 965 (C. 0. A.
Sth, 1935).
40 White v. Green River Gas Co., 8 F. (2d) 261, 263 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
A fortiori, in the gas royalty situation under the following type of lease
provision: "If any well on said premises shall produce natural gas in paying
quantities, and such natural gas is used off the premises or marketed by Lessee,
then Lessor shall be paid, as royalty, one-eighth (1/8) of the value, at the
mouth of tie well, of so much of such gas as is used off the premises and one-
eighth ("1/8) of the net proceeds from the sale of so much of such gas as is so
marketed by Lessee."
Gas royalty provisions have occasionally been examined in West Virginia
decisions, - e. g., Moore v. Ohio Valley Gas Co., 63 W. Va. 455, 60 S. B. 401
(1908), and Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 117 W. Va. 650, 187 S. E. 331
(1936).
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legal doctrines herein are not apt to prove completely successful.
For the lessor, it will be contended that the construction of the
lease must be in his favor, 1 - all things being equal, - particular-
ly where as in the instant case his revenue must depend on an ap-
parently potestative condition involving the other party's ability
to market. Furthermore, where the original lessor's reversion has
been conveyed to a life tenant with remainder over, the latter may
suffer real hardship if income from the minerals be completely
withheld." In contrast, the operator may assert the reasonings
are just, but the premises false. Neither at law nor in equity is the
duty of marketing more than one of exercising reasonable diligence ;42
if it be absolutely impossible to dispose of the gas, the complainant's
prayer for cancellation should be rejected without hesitation. Ap-
pealing to the "equities" of the situation, the operator will seek
comparison of his own very substantial investment in drilling and
equipment, with the relatively inferior sums that might have been
included in the rents or royalties from marketing. With the labor
of balancing these diametrically-opposing views, the court might be
inclined to look to the social policy involved and to hold that the
implication of such an equitable right of re-entry for condition
broken would be contrary to the welfare of the public, - to the
extent that the sanction of forfeiture for any failure to market
might lead to overproduction and consequent waste of gas. Even
despite the arid, unimaginative temper of the law in this field, the
court's "authoritative ideal, however tenuous or inarticulate",
4
could thus prove to be a recognized social interest in the conser-
vation of natural resources.
4
5
41 Bettman v. Harness, 42 W. Va. 433, 26 S. E. 271 (1896). Cf. Mastorson
v. Amarillo Oil Co., 253 S. W. 908 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), indicating that
leases should not be construed so strongly against lessees in wildcat territory.
42 The life tenant is of course entitled to tht whole of the royalties from
"already-opened" mines. Koen v. Bartlett, 41 W. Va. 559, 23 S. E. 664
(1895); Bramer v. Bramer, 84 W. Va. 168, 99 S. E. 329 (1919). Other in-
stances where the withholding of revenue from a producng well may create
real hardship can readily be imagined.
43 Carroll Gas & Oil Co. v. Skaggs, 231 Ky. 284, 21 S. W. (2d) 445 (1929);
'Rhoads Drilling Co. v. Allred, 123 Tex. 229, 70 S. W. (2d) 576 (1934). How-
ever, in Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Sander, 67 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 10th,
1933), after a federal court had used the "prudent operator') standard, the
Supreme Court reversed, 292 U. S. 272, 54 S. Ct. 671, 78 L. Ed. 788 (1934),
holding the lessee's failure to develop to be a breach of the implied covenants,
even despite unfavorable geologic data and past experience.
44 Hardman, Public Utilities, 1. The Quest for a Concept - Another Word
(1934) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 230, 240.
45 The court's interpretation of the lessee's implied obligation to develop
would thus take into account the paramount necessity of avoiding injury to
the common source of supply. See Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Fyfre, 219 Ky. 640,
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Quite apart from the purely legal considerations, there is a
similar clash in the physical and economic facts that encompass the
problem. First and foremost, the marketing of gas has to reckon
with a practical impossibility of storage once the product has been
mined. No industrial purchaser can ever lay in an extra supply,
for consumption must perforce be on a hand-to-mouth basis.
Though oil production may permit of tanks and other storage
facilities and though moderate stocks of coal might occasionally be
accumulated,4" the gas operator must either leave his surplus
mineral in place or pump it back into the ground through other
wells. 4 7 Perhaps the storage factor would seem unanswerable, were
it not for the ever-present danger of drainage, - and this more
than anything else influences the decree in gas production suits.
Estimation and conjecture as to drainage will have to take into ac-
count the high or low porosity of the gas-producing sand, its thick-
ness of "pay" and the amount of rock pressure; but when these
geological mysteries have been unveiled, one finds a curiously sym-
pathetic disposition in favor of the lessor where the entire advan-
tage of the situation appears to be with the expert operator. No
doubt in the past the perils of drainage were somewhat exagger-
ated:48 the real question now is whether modern deep-well drilling
to sands of great volume or pressure ought to necessitate additional
legal safeguards.40 It is no good to leave the product unmarketed
294 S. W. 176 (1927). In Manufacturers Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural
Gas & Oil Co., 155 Ind. 461, 474, 57 N. E. 912 (1900), it was said: "Inde-
pendently, however, of any statute for the reason already stated, the common
owners of the gas in the common reservoir, separately or together, have the
right to enjoin any and all acts of another owner which will materially injure,
or which will involve the destruction of, the property in the common fund, or
supply of gas."
40 But see Reeder, Some .Problems of the Bitnminous Coal Industry (1939)
45 W. VA. L. Q. 109.
47 An example of this is found in Hammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural
Gas Co., 225 Ky. 685, 75 S. W. (2d) 204 (1934), discussed in Comment (1935)
41 W. VA. L. Q. 431.
48 Veasey, The Law of Oil and Gas (1920) 18 MI H. L. REv. 445, 652, 749.
CRmG, OIL FINIwNG (1912) 46: "From all of these considerations it will be
seen that the migration of petroleum is a very circumscribed action, and can-
not be called upon to explain any very widespread phenomena in oil fields.
To put it briefly, petroleum goes where it can; but, from the very nature of the
conditions under which it has been formed and under which it is preserved,
its migrating movements are checked and hindered in almost all directions.
Thus, when earth oils are discovered in any locality, we are almost justified in
applying to them the famous conclusions of the gentleman who devoted his
life to research upon the subject of the 'fiery, flying serpents in the wilderness',
with special attention to their origin and subsequent history: (1) 'They was
there all the time;' and (2d) 'they stayed where they was.' "
40 TUCKER, DEEP WELL RECORDS (1936) WEST VIRGonIA GEOLOGICAL SURVEY;
MARTENS, PETROGRAPn AND CORRELATION OF DEEP WrELL SECTIONS IN WEST
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if a not far-distant development on other property can sooner or
later drain away the lessor's gas, so that eventually the whole field
is gradually "played out". Moreover, at the other end of the scale,
the producing wells may prove of small volume or be low pres-
sured; and pumping will thus be requisite in order to step up
the pressure to the regular pipe-line flow. The expense of pre-
paring the product for market has to be met ultimately from the
price the purchaser is willing to give, varying with periods of pros-
perity or depression. Which brings up the paramount economic
factor in the discussion, - the operator's profit out of marketing
transactions. With a very considerable investment in the well
itself and with some inevitable overhead, it probably amounts to
unreasonable confiscation to compel sale off the premises at sub-
stantial loss. Yet should this reasoning be completely followed out,
the operator could easily gain the unconscionable position of hold-
ing the leasehold "for purposes of speculation", without heeding
the lessor's protests. Certainly no principle of public utility law
would guarantee or limit the marketing profit within reasonable
bounds. In short, all these factors set the issue in so clear a light
that it is impossible to be blind to the difficulties inherent to the
solution.
The analysis up to this point is fairly open to criticism of
having dealt largely with abstract considerations, without going
into the more concrete matters of proof that confront counsel in
the ordinary cancellation proceeding. These often escape attention
in any theoretical discussion, but in the present instance attention
is definitely called for. By and large, it is feasible to group such
evidentiary facts under four principal headings:
1. Length of time. Between the two extremes of a rela-
tively brief suspension of marketing and the indefinitely long
cessation of operations upon the leasehold one meets a middle
ground where the time factor will be most determinative.
While there cannot be any hard-and-fast rule as to this,"0 - no
presumption of forfeiture after seven years' unexplained non-
VIRGINIA AND ADJACENT STATES (1939) WEST VImGINIA GEOLOGICAL SURVEYr.
Note Judge Maxwell's careful discussion of the drainage problem in Trimble
v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 117 W. Va. 650, 660-661, 187 S. E. 331 (1936).
0o In Starn v. Hoffman, 62 W. Va. 422, 423, 59 S. E. 179 (1907), Judge
Brannon remarked: "The very requirement to begin mining the next day, and
the very nature of the purpose of the contract show that time is of the essence
of the contract." Note (1933) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 68, 69-70: "1However, it is
believed that one year should be the maximum period, from either (a) the
expiration of the fixed term, assuming that there has never been any utilization,
or (b) the date upon which the gas was last utilized.
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marketing, - still the very absence of sales over a considerable
period appears persuasive as to the improbability of the lessee's
future success. In strict legal theory of course, the lease de-
notes the conveyance of a property interest; and it is perhaps
unsound to contend that time should here be of the essence,
unless the instrument were construed as a simple bilateral
contract" (which would be contrary to its express terms).
Anyway, it ought to be unnecessary as regards the time element
to go beyond the implication of a condition subsequent for
forfeiture, reasonably founded on a complete and permanent
failure in the true purpose of the profit a prendre.2
2. Extent of diligence. After the lessor has made out his
prima facie case by proving the lapse of time without market-
ing, the operator should then comply with the procedural bur-
den of going forward by showing precisely what efforts were
actually undertaken. Courts are apt to be lenient in this
type of litigation if in fact the operator is diligently seeking
an available market. His proof ought to go into the quality
and pressure of the gas, the accessibility of pipe lines, preva-
lent prices in that field and the extent of negotiation with pros-
pective purchasers." If there has been slackness or indifferent
management, the eventual result is not difficult to predict. On
the other hand, a sensible and candid lessee, firm in his en-
"1 The leading decision treating a lease as a bilateral contract is University
Club of Chicago v. Deakin, 265 Ill. 257, 106 N. B. 790 (1914). The weight
of authority holds to the contrary, - that a lease represents on the one side
the conveyance of an estate to the lessee, and on the other, the independent
covenants of the lessee to perform certain obligations.
52 The doctrine of essential error, when impossibility is urged as a defence
to contractual liability, might serve by way of analogy here. See, too, Muhlen-
berg v. Henning, 116 Pa. St. 138, 9 Atl. 144 (1887), excusing performance be-
cause of the mutual mistake of the parties as to the existence of adequate
iron ore. In the present instance, one might argue there was an erroneous
assumption as to the availability of a market for the gas.
63 Strange v. Hicks, 78 Okla. 1, 2, 188 Pae. 347 (1920): "The lessees for
a period of three years after the execution of the lease continued to develop
this territory, drilling some 30 wells, with the hope that sufficient gas would
be discovered that would justify a pipe-line being laid to this field. The
record shows that (the lessee) negotiated with at least 10 different pipe-line
companies or parties interested in same in order to sell the gas from these
leases, going with them upon the leases, but, owing to conditions then prevail-
ing and the small quantity of gas then discovered he was unable to secure a
line .... Finally, (he) did negotiate for a pipe-line to be laid, which was
explained to the lessors. A pipe-line was finally laid to this field." Cancella-
tion was accordingly refused in this case. It is interesting to compare the
judicial technique employed in Benedum-Trees Oil Co. v. Davis, 107 F. (2d)'
981, 986 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939): "The record is replete with evidence that for
more than nine years the lessees have made fruitless efforts to get a pipe-line
built to the wells here in question and to those adjacent ..... We are of the
opinion that because of the long delay in finding a market for the gas, the
leases terminated." See Stranahan v. Independent Natural Gas Co., 98 Mont.
597, 41 P. (2d) 39 (1935).
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deavor to operate for the benefit of both parties, can safely
anticipate favorable consideration.
3. Probability of speculation. As a sort of replication
to the alleged diligent efforts of the operator, the property
owner may introduce evidence tending to establish the other's
real purpose as one of speculating in mineral development."
No doubt a fair amount of shrewd business judgment in await-
ing satisfactory market conditions must be held reasonable in
as risky a trade as the oil and gas industry. The operator
might shut in his wells for a year or thereabouts in order to
get a better price, without encountering serious trouble. Yet
let the chancellor once gain the impression from the entire
record that the failure to market over an extended period came
about as the result of a bad speculative guess, and the case
is irretrievably lost.5 The law simply will not permit the
property to be tied up for so long a time, without rents or
royalties, by a lease that represents primarily an intent to
r4Benedum-Trees Oil Co. v. Davis, 107 F. (2d) 981, 986 (C. C. A. 6th,
1939) : "Gas leases are sometimes retained for speculative purposes, after the
cessation of exploration and the failure within a reasonable time to find a
market for the mineral. Sander v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 292 U. S.
272, 282, 54 S. Ct. 671, 78 L. Ed. 1255, 93 A. L. R. 454 (1934)." "1Shall the
lease stand to tie up the land and prevent its owner from the use of the coal
and let the lessee hold it up for speculationi1": per Brannon, J., in Starn v.
Hoffman, 62 W. Va. 422, 423, 59 S. E. 179 (1907). See Hutchinson v. McCue,
101 F. (2d) 111 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939), Brief for Appellants, pp. 36-37: "The
lessee was under the duty to sell the gas, and pay the rental therefor, yet the
trial court holds that it was equitable for the lessee to refuse a market at hand
in favor of a mere speculation, and make the lessor pay the cost of the spec-
ulation."
rs Hutchinson v. McCue, 101 F. (2d) 111, 120 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939): 1'It may
be said here .... that there is no case which goes so far as to say that the
lessee after discovery 'may cease operation, refuse to develop the property,
tie up the oil by his lease, and simply hold it for speculative purposes or to
await his own pleasure as to the time of development.' " Such was also the
approach in Collins v. Mt. Pleasant Oil & Gas Co., 85 Kan. 483, 118 Pac. 54
(1911).
In the former case, the court apparently concluded that the operator volun-
tarily, - or at least without adequate explanation, - relinquished an existing
marketing arrangement for the sale of its gas at twelve cents per m. e. f.,
because of its hope that "a more desirable customer could be found." As it
turned out, the operator later got a contract (when a projected pipe-line was
finally constructed), subject to a priority in favor of other producers totalling
50,000,000 cu. ft. daily production: but, for one reason or another, no gas was
actually sold under this contract until after the ten-year fixed term of the
lease had elapsed, - thus entailing a period of four years during which the
wells were shut in. Eventually, the operator agreed to modify the new con-
tract by selling the gas at eleven cents per m. c. f., for a limited period of
time, and marketing was then resumed, (Brief for Appellants, pp. 12-17). On
these facts, the court commented (p. 120): "One hardly expects to find a
parallel for the extraordinary conduct of the (lessee) in deliberately refusing
profitable business." However, reviewing the same record, the federal district
judge and the dissenting senior circuit judge found otherwise.
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gamble. And apparently giving up one customer to secure a
better contract with another now falls within this category.
4. Amount of investment. In the long run, "the equities"
of the suit will likely control its outcome. And aside from
the length of time, extent of diligence and probability of specu-
lation, the palient "equity" is the cost of the wells to the
operator. Where that reaches any large figure, courts are
generally reluctant to forfeit. There is every reason to pro-
tect such an investment: its very size comprehends a serious
loss of interest on capital, so that the operator has definite
incentive to utilize any sort of chance to market. Granted
this economic pressure, one has a reasonably sound guarantee
of good faith in the management of the wells. Even without
that, it would be grossly unfair and inequitable to take away
valuable gas properties when the lessor's financial claims total
only a small fraction of the expenditure already incurred.5"
Details as to development costs are thus readily admissible into
evidence, their relevancy going to the issue of the relief to be
decreed.
Such, in all its various aspects, is the problem of forfeiture
for failure to market gas from a producing leasehold. Reduced to
its respective common denominators, the outlines of certainty be-
coine more definite, and the shades of probability more distinct.
The operator who makes some rental payment by lease stipulation
or later compromise is pretty sure to be safe from troublesome dis-
putes almost indefinitely. It is only when the lessor receives no
return, - though his land seems to be burdened with a perpetual
servitude, - that the ancient tradition of the common law requires
redress. Unquestionably, on principle there must be some limit
beyond which this anomalous situation cannot continue: in the end
the operator must either market or pay, if cancellation is to be
averted. But the end may prove to be considerably far off. Dis-
regarding the mere temporary suspensiong over brief periods,
courts are fairly tolerant (and rightly so) in the situations where
no reasonable diligence can achieve successful marketing for the
ca Compare, for example, Strange v. Hicks, 78 Okla. 1, 2, 188 Pac. 347 (1920),
where lessee's total outlay was "from $60,000 to $75,000", and Pryor Moun-
tain Oil & Gas Co. v. Cross, 31 Wyo. 9, 16, 222 Pac. 570 (1924) where "the
lessees expended about $24,000 in drilling", - with Hutchinson v. McCue, 101
F. (2d) 111, 114 (C. 0. A. 4th, 1939) where the total "drilling cost" was
$37,232.04, and Benedum-Trees Oil Co. v. Davis, 107 F. (2d) 981, 984 (C. 0.
A. 6th, 1939) where the drilling and shutting-in cost was $13,400. In the first
two cases, the courts protected the investment by refusing cancellation: in the
other tvo, the "equities" were held to be with the lessor even despite the
operator's expenditures.
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immediate future. Any other holding would have the untoward
result of speeding up the reckless waste of gas resources.
The border-line instance causes the difficulty. Without de-
ciding whether the hard cases have made good or bad law, it is
proper to say that forfeiture for nonmarketing has been more
freely available in recent decisions than the historical precedents of
chancery would justify. That remedy should never be decreed un-
less in an extreme case the operator's conduct has been such as
clearly to indicate that he cannot or will not market within any
reasonable future period.5 7 And seeking equity, probably the lessor
ought to do equity by compensating the operator for casing and
necessary equipment :5s their confiscation without payment might
violate the lease, but their removal would quite likely destroy the
producing well. If one may not turn the clock back as regards
present law, then it might be wise to substitute conditional de-
crees, -- so that the forfeiture would become effective only in the
event the lessee were unwilling to pay damages based on his failure
to market. These damages could quickly be calculated if the lease
called for gas well rentals ;" otherwise, the estimated gas royalties
57 One may be asked to define more exactly the phrase, "within any reason-
able future period." Perhaps here the future should be judged by the past.
If for several years there has been complete failure to market, despite every
sort of diligent effort on the operator's part, - and if further there is no
immediate prospect of successful marketing ahead, - then surely the lease
should terminate. Practically, the investment is lost almost as completely as
if the operator had drilled a dry hole. And any other result would have the
effect of giving the operator an absolute fee simple in the gas, instead of the
exclusive profit a prendre that was bargained for.
Obviously the term "several years" is ambiguous; yet its more precise
limitation is for the legislature and not for the courts, if an iron-clad statute
of limitations is to be formulated for this problem.
58 Ordinarily, the lessee has a definite right to pull the casing, Gartland v.
Hickman, 56 W. Va. 75, 49 S. RL 14 (1904); Collins v. Mt. Pleasant Oil &
Gas Co., 85 Kan. 483, 118 Pac. 54 (1911). Yet in Warner v. Shell Petroleum
Corp., 132 Kan. 837, 842, 297 Pac. 682 (1931), it was held the "lessee is not
permited to dismantle the operating equipment and pull the casing without
offering the lessor the right to test the production and fairly determine
whether the well could be profitably operated." Thus equity may enjoin an
inequitable removal: Powers v. Bridgeport Oil Co., 238 Ill. 397, 87 N. E. 381
(1909); S. W. Oil & Gas Co. v. Kimball Oil & Dev. Co., 224 S. W. 1111 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1920). See Proposed Louisiana Mineral Code (second revised draft)
art. 117: "All casing in wells removed by the lessee must be so removed in
such manner as not to injure the property or its underlying mineral content."
Still any confiscation of the equipment without compensating the operator
would seem unfair and possibly outrageous in an extreme case.
59 The amount owing can be estimated as in fcGraw Oil & Gas Co. v.
Kennedy, 65 W. Va. 595, 64 S. E. 1027 (1909). For the conditional decree,
see Adkins v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 113 W. Va. 490, 497-498, 168 S. E.
366 (1933) : " I Therefore, the decree must be modified so as to require the drill-
ing of an offset well, or the payment of $300.00 per year in lieu thereof, until
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lost might follow the measure of damages sanctioned in those few
jurisdictions which limit the lessor to an action at law on the im-
plied covenant to market.60 In effect, the respondent could thus
pay up or surrender.
The increasing use of gas royalty provisions may before long
raise the question in West Virginia courts as to the fate of the
nonmarketing lessee. The profession has no clear indication at
present of what the judicial attitude will be on such facts.1 Mean-
time, the contractual substitution of fixed rentals for unearned
royalties in the newer leases ought to work as well here as it has
done in other states, and perhaps prove the best possible solution
to the problem. Nevertheless, whatever happens, our common law
can never allow the oil and gas lease to become through the lessee's
inactivity "a snare for the entrapment and injury of the unwary
landlord."0 '
such time as such a well is drilled, or the lease abandoned, or in case neither is
done, that the lease be cancelled as to all the property, with the exception of"
the designated acreage around the present well." Dillard v. United Fuel Gas
Co., 114 IV. Va. 684, 173 S. E. 573 (1934) ; Union Gas & Oil Co. v. Fyffe, 219 Ky.
640, 294 S. W. 176 (1927). Cf. McCutcheon v. Enon Oil & Gas Co., 102 W. Va.
345, 135 S. E. 238 (1926).
60 See Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 263 Ill. 518, 105 N. E. 308 (1914) ; Carroll
Gas & Oil Co. v. Skaggs, 231 Ky. 284, 21 S. W. (2d) 1445 (1929); Harris v.
Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N. E. 502 (1897). The ascertainment of such
damages for failure to market should be no more difficult than the estimation
of damages in libel actions or where damages for nervous shock are recover-
able.
a1 The narrow problem of failure to market gas as possible ground for for-
feiture of the lease has never been squarely considered by the supreme court
of appeals, in an instance where abandonment or expiration on the one side, or
waiver or estoppel on the other was not available as a basis for the ultimate
decision. There is no reason to believe Grass v. Big Creek Development Co.,
75 W. Va. 719, 84 S. E. 750 (1915), - holding that the lessor's remedy for
breach of implied covenants is in the absence of fraud limited to the recovery
of damages, - is necessarily controlling in this sort of situation. In Allen v.
Colonial Oil Co., 92 W. Va. 689, 699, 115 S. E. 842 (1923), it was said: "To
justify cancellation of a lease upon grounds not stipulated, but upon implied
covenants only, a case of extraordinary hardship, occasioned by lack bf dili-
gence in the development of the land leased for oil and gas, must be alleged
and proved." No doubt that "case of extraordinary hardship" will some
day be found.
02 Iron Co. v. Trout, 83 Va. 397, 409, 2 S. E. 713 (1887): "Yet, looking to
its nature and object, it cannot be contended that the lessees had the option to
work or not to work the ore mines for an indefinite time, and thus convert
what was designed to yield a handsome daily income to the lessors into a mere
barren encumbrance on his land, a cloud on his title, an incubus and a manacle
which would oppress him and destroy the marketable value of his land."
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